Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Cooperation is ubiquitous ranging from bacteria to animals as well as human societies^[@CR1]--[@CR3]^. But, how to interpret the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals represents one of the most interesting challenges in nature and social sciences and has attracted much attention across a myriad of disciplines, such as mathematics, evolutionary biology, statistical physics, to name but a few^[@CR4],[@CR5]^. Evolutionary game theory has provided a mathematical framework for addressing this intriguing challenge^[@CR6]--[@CR8]^. Particularly, the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), served as a paradigm for expressing a social poverty in the case of pairwise interactions, has been used frequently to study such an overarching issue in both theoretical and experimental literatures^[@CR9],[@CR10]^. In its basic version, two agents are asked to simultaneously make a choice between cooperation (C) and defection (D). They both receive *R* (*P*) if mutual cooperation (mutual defection). If one player cooperates while the other defects, the latter can get a temptation to defect *T*, and the former receives sucker's payoff (*S*). The ranking of these payoff are ordered as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$T > P > R > S$$\end{document}$ so that defection is the best choice regardless of the opponent's choice, which ultimately results in social dilemma^[@CR11]^.

Up till now, several mechanisms have been proposed to resolve this evolutionary conundrum^[@CR12]--[@CR23]^. Nowak attributed all these mechanisms to five rules for the promotion of cooperation named direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and spatial reciprocity^[@CR24]^. An important seminal research that inspired much more following works was the introduction of spatial structure by Nowak and May^[@CR25]^, which enabled cooperators to form compact clusters on the structured network to protect the interior from being exploited by defectors. In line with this pioneering work, various types of spatial topology have been introduced into this scope to investigate the evolution of cooperation. For example, complex network, such as BA scale free network^[@CR26]^, ER random graph^[@CR27]^, small-word network^[@CR28]^ as well as multilayer coupling network^[@CR29]^, has been proved to be an effective way for maintaining cooperation. In addition, different factors have also been considered in structured population for exploring its impact on the evolution of cooperation, for example, age structure^[@CR30],[@CR31]^, reputation^[@CR32],[@CR33]^, memory^[@CR34],[@CR35]^, voluntary participation^[@CR36],[@CR37]^, social diversity^[@CR38],[@CR39]^, to name but a few.

More recently, coevolution scenarios, served as the catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, have received much attention. Whereby, strategies and some other properties, such as the links between players^[@CR40],[@CR41]^, the teaching ability of players^[@CR42]^, the motion of players^[@CR43]^, and network structure, synchronously evolve, for a comprehensive understanding referring to refs^[@CR44],[@CR45]^. In spite of reaching prominent progress, the role of players' weight receives little attention, which seems more widespread in real society. Due to the discrepancy of people, each individual may exhibit the heterogeneity of social statues or social influence in the population, which may adaptively change in time. In fact, players that possess higher social influence have larger fitness than players with lower social influence. With this point, in this paper, we investigate how cooperation fares by studying the coevolution of vertex weight and strategy within the prisoner's dilemma game. We find that, although all players have the same social influence initially, our coevolution setup quickly results in a normal distribution of players' social influence, which in turn facilitates the evolution of cooperation. In the remainder of this paper, we first describe our modified model; later present our simulation results, and summarize our conclusions.

Results {#Sec2}
=======

We start by examining the influence of parameter $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ on the evolution of cooperation. Figure [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} features how the fraction of cooperation varies as a function of the temptation to defect *b* for different values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta =0$$\end{document}$ returns to the traditional version, where cooperation dies out soon for very small *b*. While $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta  > 0$$\end{document}$ introduces the heterogeneity of vertex weight, it seems to promote the evolution of cooperation from Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}. However, the level of cooperation will gradually decline, which indicates that moderate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ provide the best evolutionary environment: cooperators can not only survive over a larger interval of *b*, but even dominate the spatial grid. This observation is universal for different values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon $$\end{document}$. To give a broad description about the influence of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$. We define one critical threshold $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${b}_{c}$$\end{document}$, which marks the vanishment of cooperation with the smallest *b*. The insets of Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} shows the relationship between threshold $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$. Similar to the evolution of cooperation, there is an coherent resonance (i.e. a bell-shape curve): middle $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon $$\end{document}$, the more obvious this trend. All together, these observations suggest that such a simple coevolution mechanism about vertex weight and strategy not only enhances the survival of cooperation, but also guarantees the best optimal level.Figure 1The fraction of cooperation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\rho }_{{\rm{c}}}$$\end{document}$ in dependence on the temptation to defect *b* for different values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$. (**a**) and (**b**) show the results of the case $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon =0.8$$\end{document}$. For the traditional game, i.e. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta =0$$\end{document}$, cooperation vanishes for small temptations. For positive $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ the fraction of cooperation could be greatly enhanced and there is an optimal $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ for which cooperation is enhanced. The inset show the relationship between the threshold $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${b}_{c}$$\end{document}$, where cooperation dies out, and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$.

To give a complete understanding of such a coevolution mechanism. Figure [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} presents the color map encoding the fraction of cooperation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta -\varepsilon $$\end{document}$ parameter plane for different values of *b*. Interestingly, the whole plane is divided into three phases: full defection phase (phase I), well-mixed phase for cooperation and defection (phase II) and full cooperation phase (phase III). As $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon $$\end{document}$ increases, the survival of cooperators will become relatively easy. In particular, for small and middle $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon $$\end{document}$ enables system to produce various phase transitions, from phase II to phase III. That is to say, increasing $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon $$\end{document}$ induces stronger heterogeneity, which plays a crucial role in promoting cooperation as shown in refs^[@CR38]--[@CR40],[@CR46]^. While for the impact of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$, it is evident that with strong heterogeneity, middle $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ produces an optimal environment for cooperation (i.e. phase III). However, with continuous enhancement of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$, the maintenance of cooperation remains a challenge. For larger *b* (see Fig. [2(b)](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}), the territory of cooperation will become smaller yet the higher level of cooperation is robust. As such, the proposal of coevolution mechanism could guarantee beneficial environment of cooperation.Figure 2Color-code (see bar on the right) fraction of cooperation on the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta -\varepsilon $$\end{document}$ parameter plane for *b* = 1.03 (Fig. 2(a)) and *b* = 1.06 (Fig. 2(b)). Both panels show that the optimal value, where cooperation is best promoted, is about 0.05 irrespective of which temptation to defect *b* applies.

Subsequently, it is instructive to give an understanding why this mechanism resolves the social dilemma. Figure [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"} features the spatial distribution of cooperators and defectors for different steps. From top to bottom, the value of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ are equal to 0, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.2, respectively. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed on the square lattice, defectors get more benefits from cooperators and thus cooperators cannot form compact clusters to resist the invasion of defectors (see the second column) and cooperation will vanish soon. However, at the second panel, we can see that the cooperators will suffer the attack of defectors and they can survive by small *C* groups or patches. It is worth mentioning that at this moment because there are rare cooperators left to be exploited by defectors, the advantage of defectors is greatly reduced. Soon, cooperators recover the lost ground till saturated stable state, where *C* clusters are much more compact and the distance between them is much smaller than the size of clusters. There remains smaller space for cooperation. As $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ continues to increase (the third panel), the formation and expandation of compact C clusters becomes more obvious, which supresses the exploitaion of defection. As expected, for enough large $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$, though some C clusters survive, they become diluted, thus there is no sufficient protection for cooperators' territory. Nevertheless, it is clear that the evolution of cooperation is closely related to C clusters.Figure 3Typical snapshots of the distribution of strategy in step 0, 10, 100, 30000. All results are obtained for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ are equal to 0, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.2 respectively. Cooperators and defectors are marked by red and green.

Along this line, we next give some quantitative descriptions about C culsters in this coevolution mechanism. Figure [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"} shows average size of C clusters ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$. It is obvious that average C cluster size first increases with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}$ increases, the size of C clusters will fast expand. However, as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${S}_{c}$$\end{document}$ even if there are still some clusters, thus these clusters are isolated cooperator, which can not effectively resist the explortation of defection. Thus, it is easy to understand why the average size of C clusters will become zero again. Except for quantitative descriptions about C culsters, here it is instructive to further examine the potential reason of these changes. Figure [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} shows the steady distribution of vertex weight for different values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conclusion and Discussion {#Sec3}
=========================

To conclude, motivated by the realistic situation: individual's social influence or social statue (hereby, denoted by vertex weight) adaptively change according to their social performance, we have explored the effect of evolutionary game based on the vertex weight and strategy on the evolution of cooperation. Through numerical simulation, we find that our coevolution setup can promote the evolution of cooperation effectively, besides, moderate value of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The above results can help us construct a comprehensive understanding of the role of vertex weight on the evolution of cooperation under a simple framework of co-evolution model. It has been verified that different network structures have a significant impact on the evolution of cooperation. To test our model on different topologies will become more interesting in the future. Besides, interdependent networks, where seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have catastrophic and unexpected consequence in another network, have become a hot topic in recent years. How to apply our work to interdependent networks is another interesting issue that deserves our great attention in the future.

Methods {#Sec4}
=======

Here, we consider the weak prisoner's dilemma game with the normalized payoff matrix,$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Simulation results were carried out on a 200\*200 square lattice. The key quantity of the fraction of cooperation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$3\times {10}^{4}$$\end{document}$ steps. Moreover, each data were averaged over up to 10 independent runs for each set of parameter values in order to assure suitable accuracy. It is worth stating that we have found qualitative results unchanged if we give the initial state (One half of the system is C, and the other area is D).
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